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A NEW CHAPTER IN ANTITRUST LAW: THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN UNITED 
STATES v. APPLE DETERMINES HUB-AND-
SPOKE CONSPIRACY PER SE ILLEGAL 
Abstract: On June 30, 2015, in United States v. Apple, Inc., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Apple’s agreements with five publishing 
companies violated the Sherman Act. With Apple as a retailer and the publishers 
as manufacturers, the agreements between the two groups were vertical. This 
classification is significant because in 2007 in Leegin Creative Leather Products 
v. PSKS, Inc., the Supreme Court held that all vertical agreements should be ana-
lyzed under the rule of reason. Rather than looking at the structure of the agree-
ments, however, the Second Circuit focused on the type of market restraint that 
the agreements imposed. Because the vertical agreements facilitated a horizontal 
conspiracy to raise and set ebook prices, the court reasoned that the agreements 
were per se illegal. This Comment argues that the Second Circuit erred in finding 
that the agreements were per se illegal. By ignoring the rule of reason analysis, 
the Second Circuit’s holding prevented Apple from demonstrating the procom-
petitive justifications for its agreements. 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the bedrock of antitrust law, prohibits any 
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade.1 The 
Sherman Act aims to protect interbrand competition, as this unrestrained com-
petition will result in higher quality products and lower prices for consumers 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 
610 (1972) (holding that the Sherman Act is the “Magna Carta of free enterprise”); see also Tekton, 
Inc. v. Builders Bid Serv. of Utah, Inc., 676 F.2d 1352, 1354 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that only those 
conspiracies that unreasonably restrict competition are considered unlawful). Though the Sherman Act 
literally prohibits any restraints of trade, this has been modified to prohibit only unreasonable re-
straints that affect competition. Sherman Act § 1; see Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Re-
gents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984) (noting that Sherman Act focuses on the re-
straint’s effect on competition); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (explaining that 
despite Sherman Act’s inclusion of all restraints of trade, common law has subsequently limited this 
prohibition to just unreasonable restraints). Such unreasonable restraints, occurring between two or 
more parties, include raising and fixing prices and group boycotts. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. 
Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982) (explaining that price fixing agreements are per se unlawful 
regardless of any procompetitive effects); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 
212 (1959) (noting that group boycotts are per se unlawful restraints on trade); Rossi v. Standard 
Roofing, Inc. 156 F.3d 452, 465 (3d Cir. 1998) (showing that Sherman Act violation depends on con-
certed, rather than unilateral, action among two or more parties). 
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but will also maintain democratic ideals.2 There are generally two ways to ad-
dress an alleged Sherman Act violation: per se illegality and rule of reason 
analysis.3 How to assess whether a restraint is unreasonable to the point of per 
se illegality or whether it demands further market inquiry, however, has be-
come increasingly difficult over the last century.4 
As a new participant in the ebook industry, Apple allegedly violated the 
Sherman Act through its contracts with five main publishing companies.5 In 
2010, Apple included an iBookstore app on its iPad to rival Amazon’s Kindle 
in the ebook industry.6 Given that Amazon maintained 90% of the ebook re-
tailer market at the time, Apple needed to negotiate with the publishers to en-
sure that it could feasibly compete.7 Apple agreed to eliminate Amazon’s $9.99 
price standard by adopting an agency model contract that included price caps 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Khan, 522 U.S. at 15; N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). One of the fears 
that Congress intended to address through the Sherman Act was the possibility that the concentration 
of economic power among private parties would cause “antidemocratic political pressure.” Robert 
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979); see also Thomas 
A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV. 871, 874–75 (2011) (not-
ing that, because principle goal of antitrust legislation is to maximize competition, antitrust regulates 
monopolies and collusion among competing entities in the market). 
 3 See Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (noting that per se 
illegality and rule of reason analysis designed to assess the restraints’ impact on competition); In re 
Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315–17 (3d Cir. 2010) (showing that despite rule of 
reason being the primary standard for analyzing unreasonable restraints on trade, per se illegality used 
for those agreements that have been deemed to have few procompetitive justifications). 
 4 See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 779–81 (1999) (noting that because 
there is no bright line between unreasonable restraints that should be per se illegal and those that 
should receive rule of reason treatment, the applicable analysis changes with both circumstances and 
time); Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 508–09 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
the division between rule of reason analysis and per se illegality is not rigid but instead exists on a 
spectrum); see also Thomas Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 
1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1771 (1994) (suggesting that the federal court should 
abandon the per se rule and rule of reason and adopt a three-part continuum to assess the restraints’ 
impact on the market). 
 5 United States v. Apple, Inc. (Apple II), 791 F.3d 290, 296, 311 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, No. 
15-565, 2016 WL 854227 (Mar. 7, 2016) (mem.). 
 6 See id. at 301 (describing the launch of the iBookstore app). Amazon, one of the largest retailers 
on the Internet, released the Kindle in 2007. Id. at 299; see Kathleen Sharp, Amazon’s Bogus Anti-
Apple Crusade, SALON (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/01/12/amazons_bogus_anti_
apple_crusade/ [https://perma.cc/Y6WK-CCBB] (explaining that Amazon, one of the world’s largest 
technology companies and retailers, set its ebook prices at $9.99 to induce consumers to buy the Kin-
dle). As the second portable electronic device on the ebook market, Amazon’s Kindle enabled users to 
buy, download, and read ebooks. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 299. Similarly, the iBookstore app on the iPad 
functioned as an ebook marketplace, in which readers could buy, download, and read ebooks. Id. at 
301. 
 7 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 301–02; see also Rory Maher, Here’s Why Amazon Will Win the eBook 
War: Kindle Already Has 90% eBook Market Share, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.
businessinsider.com/amazon-selling-90-of-all-e-books-2010-1 [https://perma.cc/B42U-5LE9] (noting 
that as of 2010, Amazon sold 90% of all ebooks, making the Kindle the standard ebook format). 
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and a Most-Favored-Nations (“MFN”) clause.8 With the combination of the 
agency model, price caps, and the MFN clause, Apple’s contracts with pub-
lishers resulted in raised prices for both books and ebooks in alleged violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 
In June 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced a 
question regarding the legality of these contracts in United States v. Apple 
(“Apple II”).10 To assess whether Apple’s agreements with the publishing com-
panies violated the Sherman Act, the court had to decide if the agreements 
were vertical or horizontal in order to apply the appropriate analysis.11 In con-
trast to recent jurisprudence, the majority of the Second Circuit held that Apple 
facilitated a horizontal conspiracy to raise and set prices, which is per se ille-
gal, through Apple’s use of vertical contracts with the publishing companies 
that took the form of a hub-and-spoke arrangement.”12 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 299, 302–05. The agency model gave publishers the ability to set retail 
prices. Id. at 303. A “most-favored-nations” (“MFN”) clause is an agreement by one party, such as a 
supplier, to give the same conditions to the party with whom it is contracting as it does for its best 
customer. Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive Effects 
of “Most-Favored-Customer” Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 519 (1996). These antidiscrimination 
clauses promote uniformity in pricing for different customers. Id. In an agency model, MFN clauses 
affect the retail price rather than the wholesale price. See Michael L. Weiner & Craig G. Falls, Coun-
seling on MFNS After E-Books, 28 ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 68, 69 (explaining that MFNs in 
agency agreements, which are increasingly used for e-commerce, determines the retail price for the 
product sold on the agent’s platform, whereas MFNs in wholesale agreements determine the whole-
saler’s price but not necessarily the retail price). Given Apple’s agency model, the publishing compa-
nies would have to set the retail price at $9.99 for Apple’s ebooks if they continued to use the whole-
sale agreement with Amazon. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 305. 
 9 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 296, 310; see also Robert H. Lande, Symposium, A Traditional and Textu-
alist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer 
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2350 (2013) (noting that one of the primary reasons for adopting 
the Sherman Act was to protect consumers from companies that raised prices to supracompetitive 
levels). Because of the price caps, the price of hardcovers directly affected the ebook prices. See Apple 
II, 791 F.3d at 296, 310 (noting that price caps in Apple’s agreements affected both ebook and hard-
cover prices). Consequently, the publishers raised the prices of hardcovers in order to bring the corre-
sponding ebooks into the higher price cap bracket. Id.; see also supra notes 81–83 and accompanying 
text (explaining that combination of MFN clause and price caps resulted in raised and fixed ebook 
prices, which eliminated all retail competition in violation of the Sherman Act). 
 10 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 296. 
 11 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887–88 (2007) (holding that 
sufficient economic differences require treating horizontal and vertical agreements differently); Bus. 
Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (noting that generally, agreements between 
competitors result in horizontal restraints and agreements between parties at different market levels, 
such as retailer and distributor, result in vertical restraints). 
 12 See Apple II, 791 F.3d at 297 (affirming district court’s decision to hold Apple’s conduct as per 
se unlawful because raising ebook prices constituted restraint on trade); see, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 
887–88 (defining vertical agreements as different from horizontal agreements when applying antitrust 
analysis); Khan, 522 U.S. at 10, 15 (applying rule of reason analysis for vertical price agreements and 
for agreements in businesses with which the courts are unfamiliar); Toledo Mack Sales & Serv. v. 
Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that rule of reason analysis applies in 
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This Comment suggests that the Second Circuit misinterpreted the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2007 holding in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, 
Inc. in determining that Apple’s agreements constituted a horizontal conspiracy 
to raise and fix prices and were therefore per se illegal.13 Part I of this Com-
ment provides an overview of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the factual 
and procedural history of the Apple II decision.14 Part II of this Comment ex-
amines the development of the standards by which horizontal and vertical 
agreements are analyzed for antitrust violations and how the majority and dis-
sent in Apple II diverged over how to assess vertical agreements that have hor-
izontal effects.15 Finally, Part III of this Comment concludes that vertical price 
agreements, even if embedded in hub-and-spoke arrangements, are treated un-
der the rule of reason to give parties, especially in new industries, the oppor-
tunity to present any procompetitive justifications.16 
I. UNITED STATES V. APPLE AND APPLE’S RESTRAINTS OF TRADE 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act protects against unreasonable restraints of 
trade.17 What constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade depends on what 
market forces are involved and what test applies to assess this unreasonable-
ness.18 Section A of this Part explains the history behind Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.19 Section B then describes the events culminating in Apple’s al-
leged violation of the Sherman Act in the Apple II case.20 Finally, Section C 
outlines the procedural history of Apple II.21 
                                                                                                                           
hub-and-spoke context for vertical agreement even if vertical agreement furthers illegal horizontal 
conspiracy). 
 13 See infra notes 93–113 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 17–62 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 63–92 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 93–113 and accompanying text. 
 17 See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (making illegal any contract that restrains trade or 
commerce among states); Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (noting that Sherman Act’s prohibition of restraints of 
trade limited to those that are unreasonable); see also Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 218 (noting that to 
bring a successful claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must prove first, that the 
defendant was part of a contract, combination, or conspiracy, and second, that this conspiracy resulted 
in an unreasonable restraint on trade). 
 18 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 888 (noting that Court has applied different rules for agreements that 
are vertical as opposed to those that are horizontal); Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 730 (showing that whether 
parties who form agreement are at different or same market levels determines whether agreement is 
vertical or horizontal). 
 19 See infra notes 22–42 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 43–52 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 53–62 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Common Law Approach to Assessing Unreasonableness  
Under the Sherman Act 
Though the Sherman Act prohibits any restraints of trade, common law 
has narrowed its application to just unreasonable restraints of trade.22 Simply, 
any agreement that has a net anticompetitive effect is considered illegal.23 
What constitutes a restraint on trade, however, depends on the economic condi-
tions at the time.24 
To assess whether a restraint of trade is unreasonable, courts have estab-
lished three tests: per se illegality, rule of reason analysis, and an abbreviated 
quick-look rule of reason approach.25 Per se illegality deems conduct to be so 
harmful and anticompetitive that it does not warrant further analysis.26 The 
plaintiff only needs to show that the defendant engaged in the challenged con-
                                                                                                                           
 22 Sherman Act § 1; see Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (explaining that only unreasonable restraints, rather 
than all restraints, are illegal); Tekton, 676 F.2d at 1354 (limiting unlawful restraints of trade to those 
which “‘unreasonably’ restrict competition” (quoting N. Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. at 5)); see also Laura 
Kaplan, Comment, An Implicit Exemption, Implicitly Applied: Blurring the Line of Accommodation 
Between Labor Policy and Antitrust Law in Harris v. Safeway, 53 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPP. 181, 184 n.28 
(2012) (noting that Sherman Act has been narrowed to only banning “unreasonable restraints”). 
 23 See Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Rea-
son Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561, 562, 572, 577 (2009) (explaining that rule of reason applies a 
cost-benefit analysis to determine whether anticompetitive effects outweigh procompetitive justifica-
tions). 
 24 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (observing that application of Sherman Act must change to reflect 
current economy); Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 732 (holding that the Sherman Act, instead of being static, 
was enacted to evolve through the common law); see also Rebecca Haw, Delay and Its Benefits for 
Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertainty, 55 B.C. L. REV. 331, 347 (2014) (noting that be-
cause the Sherman Act is analyzed under common law, what constitutes a restraint on trade must 
change with economic conditions). 
 25 See Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (identifying per se illegality and rule of reason 
as two means of assessing restraints on trade); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d at 315–
17 (identifying quick look rule of reason as truncated version of standard rule of reason approach). In 
deciding whether per se illegality or the rule of reason applies, however, the courts still need to assess 
the current market. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26 (noting that per se ille-
gality, despite presumption of unlawfulness, still may involve market inquiry). 
 26 See Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (noting that per se unlawful restraints generally have damaging anti-
competitive effects with little to no procompetitive justifications); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 8 (2000), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-
guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQ9F-WKP2] 
[hereinafter FTC & DOJ GUIDELINES] (explaining that per se illegal agreements include those agree-
ments among competitors designed to increase prices or limit output). This strict standard has been 
limited to instances of horizontal agreements that involve price fixing or market allocations. See Lee-
gin, 551 U.S. at 886 (noting that per se illegality limited to those restraints that have demonstrated 
their anticompetitive effects with little to no procompetitive benefit, including agreements among 
direct competitors to fix prices or divide markets); see also NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 
128, 138 (1998) (holding that per se rule inappropriate for boycotts unless evidence of horizontal 
agreement included). 
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duct.27 Because per se illegality removes any need to study the restraint’s po-
tential procompetitive justifications, the application of this rule has been lim-
ited to conduct that always or almost always tends to restrict competition and 
decrease output.28 
For the rule of reason analysis, the court balances the anticompetitive re-
sults of a restraint against its procompetitive justifications.29 The plaintiff bears 
the burden of asserting any anticompetitive effects.30 If the defendant is able to 
demonstrate any procompetitive effects, then the plaintiff must assert an alter-
native option that would have fewer anticompetitive results.31 Thus, the rule of 
reason differentiates between those restraints that are anticompetitive and 
harmful and those that are procompetitive.32 
The abbreviated quick-look rule of reason approach is used when the 
agreement is noticeably anticompetitive, but the defendant is given the oppor-
tunity to put forth any plausible justifications that promote the value of compe-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See FTC & DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 3 (noting that per se illegality forecloses Court 
from assessing any anticompetitive or procompetitive effects); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Supe-
rior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990) (holding that administrative efficiency 
derived from per se rule saves courts from having to delve into industry and market effects to prove 
restraint unreasonable (citing N. Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. at 5)). 
 28 Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 723 (citing Nw. Wholesale Stationer’s, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Print-
ing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289–90 (1985)); see Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894 (noting that per se illegality inap-
propriate when there are sufficient procompetitive justifications); FTC & DOJ GUIDELINES, supra 
note 26, at 3 (noting that per se illegality precludes Court’s consideration of agreement’s anticompeti-
tive or procompetitive impact on market); see also Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, 
Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 316 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that per se rule inappropriate when “economic and 
competitive effects of the challenged practice are unclear”). For example, the per se illegality test is 
applied when direct competitors boycott each other or agree to fix prices. Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 
U.S. 1, 5 (2006); NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 135; see also Christopher R. Leslie, Comment, Achieving Effi-
ciency Through Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 
243, 246 (1993) (identifying horizontal price fixing, group boycotts, tying arrangements, and market-
dividing agreements as per se illegal restraints of trade). 
 29 Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 507 (2d Cir. 2004); Federal Stat-
utes and Regulations: The Supreme Court, 2009 Term: Leading Cases, Section III, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 340, 405–06 (2010) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (noting that, unlike per se rule of illegality, the 
agreements under the rule of reason are presumptively legal until proven otherwise). Overall, the rule 
of reason considers the nature of the industry, the type of restraint on the market, and the reasons for 
the restraint’s existence. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 607; Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 
U.S. 231, 238 (1918). But see Edward Cavanagh, The Rule of Reason Re-Examined, 67 BUS. LAW. 
435, 437 (2012) (explaining that the rule of reason analysis is a “mess” because of its “(1) high costs, 
(2) lack of predictability, and (3) significant risk of error”). 
 30 Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 386 F.3d at 506. 
 31 Id. at 507. 
 32 See Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 691–92 (explaining that rule of reason assesses 
restraint’s impact on competition); see also Michael A. McCann, Antitrust, Governance, and Postsea-
son College Football, 52 B.C. L. REV. 517, 533 (2011) (observing that in reality rule of reason favors 
defendants and allows agreements in which procompetitive justifications offset anticompetitive ef-
fects). 
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tition.33 This hybrid analysis is generally reserved for restraints that are inher-
ently suspect but may have sufficient reasons to not warrant per se treatment.34 
Generally, there are two types of parties who collude to form these re-
straints of trade: parties on the same market level who form horizontal agree-
ments and parties on different market levels who form vertical agreements.35 
Horizontal agreements are considered the typical form of per se restraints on 
trade.36 By contrast, vertical agreements are not necessarily unlawful.37 Be-
                                                                                                                           
 33 Leading Cases, supra note 29, at 406; see Texaco, 547 U.S. at 7 n.3 (noting that quick look 
approach reserved for agreements that are obviously anticompetitive and obviate further inquiry); Cal. 
Dental, 526 U.S. at 770 (explaining that quick look analysis applied when anticompetitive effects are 
readily apparent). 
 34 See Major League Baseball Props., 542 F.3d at 317–18 (citing Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 759, 
771) (explaining that, because quick look analysis limited to agreements that are obviously anticom-
petitive, rule of reason appropriate standard if agreement has net procompetitive effect or no effect on 
competition). But see Leading Cases, supra note 29, at 406 (noting that in practice, inquiry into pro-
competitive justifications has set bar too high for defendants). For example, in 2010, in American 
Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the quick look rule 
of reason could be applied to the NFL’s licensing agreements. 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010); see Leading 
Cases, supra note 29, at 401 (showing that Court’s application of quick look analysis, specifically 
holding that the NFL’s contracts could survive such analysis, was a rare moment for agreements sub-
ject to this type of evaluation); see also PHILIP AREEDA, FED. JUD. CTR., THE “RULE OF REASON” IN 
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 37–38 (1981), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
antitrust.pdf/$file/antitrust.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TUT-5TH5] (noting that in situations in which two 
major corporations, such as Ford and General Motors, form a selling arrangement, their conduct may 
not be necessarily unlawful per se, but the anticompetitive effects are so apparent that a court does not 
need to consider them). 
 35 Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 730; see NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 136 (holding that vertical agreement be-
tween supplier and customer and horizontal agreement between competitors); see also Roger D. Blair 
& Jeffrey L. Harrison, Cooperative Buying, Monopsony Power, and Antitrust Policy, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 331, 366 (1992) (discussing how horizontal agreement exists when competing buyers collude); 
Jordan A. Dresnick & Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti, Vertical Price Agreements in the Wake of Leegin 
v. PSKS: Where Do We Stand Now?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229, 230–31 (2009) (identifying vertical 
agreements as between manufacturer, an upstream party, and distributor, a downstream party). 
 36 Catalano v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980); see also Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 434 (holding that horizontal price-fixing agreements pose threat to free mar-
ket); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225–26 n.59 (1940) (noting that price 
fixing agreements unlawful because of threat to “central nervous system of the economy”); Louis 
Kaplow, On The Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 683, 
694–95 (2011) (explaining that identifying horizontal agreements between direct competitors is easy 
when there is a clear agreement or promise between the parties but becomes more difficult when there 
is no clear meeting of the minds); M. Laurence Popofsky, Does Leegin Liberate the Law Governing 
Horizontal Conspiracies from Its Vertical Contamination?, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 28 (2012) (ad-
dressing dual concerns arising from horizontal agreements in that they create an otherwise impossible 
restraint in the market and have the potential to create otherwise nonexistent market power). Though 
the Court has narrowed its application of the per se rule, horizontal price-fixing continues to be con-
sidered per se illegal. See Leslie, supra note 28, at 249 (explaining that Court’s persistently strict re-
gard for horizontal price-fixing based on belief that agreement is “necessarily anticompetitive and 
inefficient”). 
 37 See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) (discussing how vertical 
agreements’ benefit in furthering interbrand competition outweighs potential harm of limiting in-
trabrand competition). 
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cause of the potential procompetitive effects of vertical agreements, courts 
have slowly moved towards the more lenient rule of reason for analyzing ver-
tical restraints.38 
Not all agreements, however, are clearly delineated as horizontal or verti-
cal; agreements may consist of a combination of horizontal and vertical 
agreements.39 One such example of these hybrid agreements is hub-and-spoke 
conspiracies, in which one agent, the hub, creates multiple parallel agreements 
with individual parties, the spokes, who are at a different level of the market.40 
Any agreement that the hub makes with the spokes would be considered a ver-
tical agreement and therefore would likely be treated under the rule of reason 
analysis.41 If the spokes have made any agreements among themselves, how-
ever, they create a “rim” to the agreement, which would be considered a hori-
zontal conspiracy.42 
B. Apple’s Entry into the eBook Industry 
Apple included the iBookstore as one of its features on its iPad in 2010.43 
The iBookstore is an application that functions as a virtual marketplace, ena-
bling users to buy and download ebooks to read on the iPad.44 In order to com-
pete with Amazon’s Kindle, Apple negotiated with the “Big Six” publishing 
companies to create new retail agreements for its ebooks.45 Knowing that the 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 898–99 (holding that rule of reason serves to remove anticompetitive 
agreements from the market); Cont’l T.V., 433 U.S. at 54 (noting that Court has increasingly applied 
rule of reason for vertical restraints because per se illegality too rigid); see also In re Ins. Brokerage 
Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d at 318 (holding that rule of reason analysis applied to almost all vertical 
agreements). Such procompetitive effects derived from cooperation between manufacturers and retail-
ers can include increased interbrand competition and efficiency. Carlo Luis Rodes, Note, Giving Teeth 
to Sherman Act Enforcement in the Intrabrand Context: Weaning Courts Off Their Interbrand Addic-
tion Post-Sylvania, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 957, 959 (2009). 
 39 See Howard Hess Dental Lab., Inc. v. Dentsply Intern, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 254–55 (3d Cir. 
2010) (showing that hub-and-spoke conspiracies consist of both vertical and horizontal conspiracies). 
 40 Id. at 255; Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 
F.3d 430, 435 n.3 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 41 See Total Benefits, 552 F.3d at 435 n.3 (noting that though there are multiple parallel agree-
ments between the hub and spokes, there still must be a horizontal agreement among the spokes in 
order for per se illegality to apply). 
 42 Howard Hess, 602 F.3d at 255; Total Benefits, 552 F.3d at 435 n.3. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged that there are “no special exceptions” for hub-and-spoke con-
spiracies in applying the per se standard. Total Benefits, 552 F.3d at 435. Instead, the plaintiffs must 
still prove that a horizontal agreement exists among the spokes; otherwise, a rimless hub-and-spoke 
agreement generally falls under rule of reason analysis. Id. at 436. 
 43 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 301. 
 44 Id. at 296. 
 45 Id. at 301–02, 305. As one of the only ebook retailers, Amazon enjoyed 90% of the ebook 
industry market in 2010. Id. at 301; see also Maher, supra note 7 (discussing how Amazon’s domina-
tion of ebook market enabled company to dictate prices to publishers). Apple worked with what were 
collectively referred to as the “Big Six”: Hachette, Harper Collins, Macmillan, Penguin, Random 
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Big Six hoped to eliminate Amazon’s $9.99 price standard, Apple offered to 
implement price caps for all ebooks sold through agency model contracts.46 
The price caps that Apple’s contracts established created a ceiling for publish-
ers’ prices.47 
Additionally, Apple included a MFN clause in its contracts with each pub-
lishing company.48 This clause forced the publishing companies to change the 
contracts for all of their retailers.49 The resultant contracts enabled the publish-
ing companies to obtain control over ebook pricing.50 The immediate effect of 
these changes was an increase in both ebook and physical book prices and a 
reduction in the publishing companies’ sales.51 Although this change did elim-
                                                                                                                           
House, and Simon & Schuster. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 298. Except for Random House, five of the Big 
Six entered into contracts with Apple and became the Publishing Defendants in Apple II. Id. at 296–
98. Together, the Big Six published 90% of the New York Times bestsellers in the United States in 
2010. Id. Despite competing over authors and agents, these publishers were in relative harmony re-
garding pricing strategies. See id. at 300 (noting that publishers joined together to try and eliminate 
Amazon’s $9.99 price standard). 
 46 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 301–04. Amazon used a traditional wholesale model, in which the pub-
lishers suggested a list price for ebooks and received a wholesale price for each sold, but the retailers 
set the retail price for each ebook. Id. at 299. Because ebooks were cheaper to manufacture, store, and 
deliver, both the wholesale and retail price for ebooks were generally less than their hardcover or 
paperback counterparts. Id. In order to entice consumers to buy the Kindle, however, Amazon imple-
mented a “loss leader” strategy, meaning it set the retail price of certain ebooks below the wholesale 
price, thereby incurring short-term costs in return for potential long-term gains. Id.; see also, Michael 
L. Weiner, Loss Leaders as Misleaders? State Bans on Below Cost Pricing, 8 ANTITRUST 10, 12 
(1994) (explaining that state statutes prohibiting loss leader, or “sales below cost” strategy, seem to 
contradict the Sherman Act’s emphasis on free competition, but protect smaller merchants from being 
priced out entirely). Despite the defendants’ complaints of Amazon’s “predatory” pricing, the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed these complaints because they failed 
to prove that Amazon’s prices “were below its marginal costs,” and, even if they were predatory, the 
solution was not to unlawfully fix prices. United States v. Apple, Inc. (Apple I), 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 
642 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, Apple II, 791 F.3d 290, cert. denied, 2016 WL 854227. In 1997, in State 
Oil Co. v. Khan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the legality of such vertical maximum price fixing 
should be assessed under the rule of reason. 522 U.S. at 15, 17. 
 47 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 303–04. 
 48 Id. at 304–05. 
 49 Id. Historically, MFN clauses have not been challenged as antitrust violations in court. See 
Weiner, supra note 8, at 68 (discussing how, until Apple I, MFNs were not considered unlawful be-
cause they generally do not result in anticompetitive restraints on the market). Unlike wholesale mod-
els, in which the retailer sets the price, the agency model allowed the publishers to set the prices for 
ebooks; the retailer then pays a fixed percentage for each sale. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 303. If the pub-
lishers maintained the wholesale model with Amazon while agreeing to the agency model with Apple, 
Amazon could continue to use its $9.99 “loss leader” strategy unabated and the publishers, due to the 
MFN clause’s best-terms agreement, would be forced to match the $9.99 pricing for Apple. Id. at 305. 
To retain control over pricing and raise prices to maintain a profit, the publishers needed to switch all 
retailers to an agency model. Id. Even after Apple signed contracts with each of the Publishing De-
fendants, it continued to monitor their negotiations with Amazon to ensure that Amazon was switched 
from the wholesale model to the agency model. Id. at 309. 
 50 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 303. 
 51 Id. at 310–11. At trial, one expert compared the post-contract sales to pre-contract sales and 
calculated that the Publishing Defendants experienced a 12.9% loss in sales; another expert compared 
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inate Amazon’s $9.99 price standard, Apple’s contracts allegedly violated Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act as they raised and set prices for ebooks.52 
C. Apple’s Failed Battle to Justify Its Contracts 
In April of 2012, the Department of Justice and thirty-three states and ter-
ritories filed a civil complaint against Apple and the publishing companies who 
signed agreements with Apple (“Publishing Defendants”), alleging a violation 
of the Sherman Act.53 The Department of Justice argued that Apple and the 
Publishing Defendants colluded in fixing retail prices for bestsellers and newly 
released ebooks, which would have eliminated price competition among retail-
ers.54 After a three-week bench trial, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York found Apple guilty of violating Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.55 The court found that, through its contracts, Apple assembled a group of 
competitors who increased and set prices, thereby eliminating any retail price 
competition.56 The court held that Apple’s involvement as a hub in a hub-and-
spoke conspiracy to raise and set prices was per se unlawful.57 
Apple appealed the verdict.58 In a split decision, a panel of the Second 
Circuit affirmed the conviction in 2015, finding Apple’s contracts to be per se 
illegal and in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.59 Recognizing the 
                                                                                                                           
the Publishing Defendants’ sales to Random House, which had not solidified an agreement with Ap-
ple, to find that the Publishing Defendants’ experienced a 14.5% loss in sales. Id. 
 52 See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (outlawing all contracts or conspiracies that restrain 
trade); Apple II, 791 F.3d at 296 (holding that Apple’s agreement with the Publishing Defendants to 
raise ebook prices constituted a violation of the Sherman Act). 
 53 Complaint at 1, Apple I, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (No. 12 CV 2826), 2012 WL 1193205; see Sher-
man Act § 1 (prohibiting any contract or conspiracy that restrains trade); Apple I, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 
645, 687 (arguing that Apple violated the Sherman Act by forming agreements with the Publishing 
Defendants to raise and fix ebook prices). 
 54 Apple I, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 645. Although the Publishing Defendants settled with the Depart-
ment of Justice, Apple proceeded to trial. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 296–97. The Publishing Defendants 
agreed to a two-year provision to refrain from entering into any agreements that would restrict or 
impede ebook retailers’ ability to set, alter, or reduce ebook prices. Id. at 296–97, 312. 
 55 Apple I, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 694; see Sherman Act § 1 (prohibiting any contract or conspiracy 
that restrains trade). 
 56 Apple I, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 647–48, 686, 709. 
 57 Id. at 706–07. The district court also found that regardless of the contracts’ per se illegality, 
Apple’s contracts still would have been found illegal under the rule of reason analysis. Id. at 694. 
 58 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 321. 
 59 Id. at 297, 335, 339. The district court’s injunctive order prohibited Apple from using MFN 
clauses and required Apple to treat the iBookstore’s contractual provisions in the same way as its 
other apps. Id. at 313. The majority distinguished Apple II from the Supreme Court’s Leegin precedent 
in that Apple, as a hub, facilitated the horizontal conspiracy among the publishers, the spokes. Id. at 
324–25. The majority instead relied on the 1959 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Klor’s, Inc. v. 
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc, as well as the 1966 U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp. to support its holding that it is the restraint imposed on trade that matters for pur-
poses of per se illegality and not the arrangement of agreements. Id. at 322–23 (citing United States v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor’s, 359 U.S. 207). 
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novelty of the ebook industry, Judge Debra Ann Livingston, writing alone, ap-
plied the quick-look rule of reason analysis and affirmed the conviction.60 
Judge Raymond J. Lohier concurred solely on the application of per se illegali-
ty and resultant conviction.61 The lone dissenter, Judge Dennis Jacobs, would 
have reversed Apple’s conviction, finding the use of per se illegality inappro-
priate for a vertical agreement.62 
II. ARCHITECTURE OR EFFECTS? MAJORITY OF SECOND CIRCUIT FOCUSED ON 
EFFECTS THAT VERTICAL AGREEMENT HAD ON HORIZONTAL RETAILERS 
WHEREAS DISSENT FOCUSED ON STRUCTURE OF AGREEMENT 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit majority panel’s 2015 
decision in United States v. Apple (“Apple II”) demonstrates the ongoing con-
fusion in applying per se illegality versus rule of reason analysis for hub-and-
spoke conspiracy agreements.63 Generally, vertical agreements are found 
among forces at different market levels, such as between distributor and manu-
facturer.64 In contrast, horizontal agreements are found among forces at the 
same market level, or among direct competitors.65 Significantly, in 2007, in 
Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that even if the vertical agreement verified the horizontal conspiracy’s pres-
ence, the agreement itself was still vertical.66 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Apple II, 791 F.3d at 329–35 (applying rule of reason analysis to address possible procom-
petitve justifications from Apple’s innovation). Judge Livingston held that per se illegality was still 
the appropriate test to apply for Apple’s agreements, but she acknowledged Apple’s argument regard-
ing the innovation of the business. Id. at 329. Under both per se illegality and the quick look rule of 
reason, however, Judge Livingston found that Apple’s agreements were unlawful. Id. at 329–30. 
 61 See id. at 339–40 (Lohier, J., concurring) (noting that because Apple’s appeal depended only 
on the application of the per se rule, the court should not have considered the rule of reason analysis 
and instead should have affirmed the conviction based only on the contracts’ per se illegality). 
 62 See id. at 340–41, 347–48 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (emphasizing both the architecture of the 
agreements as well as the procompetitive effects to highlight majority’s error in applying per se ille-
gality). The dissent relied on the Supreme Court’s precedent in Leegin and the Third Circuit’s persua-
sive decision in Toledo Mack to find that the majority should have applied the rule of reason analysis 
when a vertical agreement facilitates a horizontal conspiracy, such as in the case of a rimmed hub-
and-spoke conspiracy. Id. at 346–47. 
 63 See United States v. Apple, Inc. (Apple II), 791 F.3d 290, 314, 322 (2d Cir. 2015) (looking at 
restraint’s effect on market rather that at composition of agreement), cert. denied, No. 15-565, 2016 
WL 854227 (Mar. 7, 2016) (mem.); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) (holding that because of dependence on market condi-
tions, no bright line exists between per se illegality and rule of reason analysis). 
 64 See Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (differentiating between 
horizontal and vertical agreements). 
 65 See id. at 730–31 n.4 (“[A] restraint is horizontal not because it has horizontal effects, but be-
cause it is the product of a horizontal agreement.”). 
 66 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007) (holding that if a 
cartel, which is a group of competing manufacturers or retailers on the same market level, conspires to 
decrease output or reduce competition, the agreement is per se illegal). 
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The distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements is essential for 
antitrust cases in that it determines what analysis applies to assess the agree-
ments’ legality.67 Traditionally, vertical agreements that set prices were consid-
ered illegal per se.68 Per se illegality is significantly more efficient than the 
rule of reason in that it alleviates the parties’ burden of demonstrating econom-
ic conditions and any procompetitive or anticompetitive effects.69 
Common law, however, has gradually shifted away from applying per se 
illegality for vertical agreements.70 In 1977, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed its application of per se illegality, 
holding that vertical nonprice agreements lacked the anticompetitive effects to 
justify per se illegality.71 Because vertical nonprice agreements are widely used 
and lack pernicious anticompetitive effects, the Court held that these restraints 
could be appropriately policed through the rule of reason.72 In 1997, in State 
Oil Co. v. Khan, the U.S. Supreme Court further limited the application of per 
se illegality by rejecting that rule for vertical agreements that set maximum 
prices.73 Finally, in 2007, in Leegin, the U.S. Supreme Court, in ruling that ver-
tical agreements to set minimum prices should also be analyzed through the 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See id. at 888 (holding that rules governing horizontal restraints diverge from rules governing 
vertical restraints); Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 730 (holding that horizontal restraints comprised of agree-
ments among competitors and vertical restraints comprised of agreements among forces at different 
levels of distribution); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 318 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting 
that essentially all vertical agreements analyzed under rule of reason). 
 68 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 405 (1911) (holding that 
manufacturers prohibited from fixing prices), overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. 877; Thomas B. Leary & 
Erica S. Mintzer, The Future of Resale Price Maintenance, Now that Doctor Miles Is Dead, 4 N.Y.U. 
J. L. & BUS. 303, 303, 307 (2007) (explaining how agreements between buyers and sellers to fix pric-
es were considered per se illegal from 1911 to 2007). 
 69 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990) 
(citing N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting that per se illegality removes 
arduous task of market investigation simply to determine whether restraint unreasonable). 
 70 See Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc., v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 
434–35 (6th Cir. 2008) (showing that, after Leegin, only horizontal agreements forming group boy-
cotts evaluated as per se unlawful); see also NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998) 
(limiting per se rule for boycotts to horizontal agreements among direct competitors). Although per se 
illegality has administrative benefits, this rule proscribes any possibility of procompetitive justifica-
tions. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 430 (1990) (citing N. Pac. R.R. Co., 356 
U.S. at 5) (explaining how per se illegality obviates need to investigate market as restraint is simply 
considered per se unreasonable). 
 71 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977). 
 72 Id. at 58–59. 
 73 522 U.S. 3, 15–17 (1997). The Court in Khan believed there was insufficient economic justifi-
cation to warrant applying per se illegality to vertical price fixing. Id. at 18. The Court instead consid-
ered the rule of reason to be the appropriate standard with which to police vertical maximum price 
agreements. Id. at 17. 
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rule of reason, overturned the 1911 decision from Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co.74 
Notably, the majority in Apple II acknowledged this shift in jurisprudence 
away from applying per se illegality for vertical restraints.75 The majority, 
however, distinguished Leegin and its progeny from other hub-and-spoke cases 
in which the vertical agreements that furthered a horizontal price-fixing con-
spiracy were per se unlawful.76 The majority found support for its argument in 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1959 decision in Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, Inc., in which the Court held that an agreement between a retailer and 
its distributors to boycott a competing retailer, despite being a vertical agree-
ment, represented a per se restraint.77 The majority in Apple II concluded that 
vertical organizers who enter into vertical agreements in addition to participat-
ing in horizontal price-fixing conspiracies are liable for the horizontal conspir-
acy.78 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894; Dr. Miles Med. Co., 220 U.S. at 405. Technically, the Leegin decision 
only applied to vertical minimum price-fixing agreements, but the Court acknowledged that resale 
price maintenance, arising from both vertical and horizontal agreements, can have procompetitive 
benefits. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 898–99 (noting that rule of reason used to weed out anticompetitive 
restraints while furthering procompetitive effects of vertical price agreements); Total Benefits, 552 
F.3d at 435 (explaining how Leegin decision overturned per se treatment of vertical price restraints in 
favor of rule of reason analysis); see also Leary, supra note 68, at 325 (discussing how in the Court’s 
decision to apply rule of reason analysis to vertical price agreements in Leegin, the Court recognized 
that such agreements can have procompetitive impact on market). 
 75 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 321. 
 76 Id. at 324–25; see United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 144–45 (1966) (holding 
that multilateral action between General Motors and its dealers to boycott discounters is per se re-
straint of trade); see also Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1959) 
(holding that agreement among manufacturers, distributors, and retailers to boycott a retail store was 
per se unlawful). 
 77 Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 212–13; Apple II, 791 F.3d at 322. The Court’s decision in Klor’s does not 
differentiate between horizontal and vertical agreements but instead points to the “wide combination” 
of manufacturers, distributors, and retailers in asserting the per se rule. Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 212–13; 
see also Gen. Motors, 384 U.S. at 145 (holding that joint collaboration among manufacturers and 
dealers was per se violation of Sherman Act). Judge Lohier’s concurrence in Apple II agreed with this 
distinction from Leegin, affirming on the basis that Apple’s vertical agreement was just part of the 
horizontal agreement among the publishers to fix ebook prices. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 339–40 (Lohier, 
J., concurring). More recently, in 2000, in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a retailer who formed individual vertical agree-
ments with multiple manufacturers created a horizontal agreement to boycott other retailers that was 
per se unlawful. 221 F.3d 928, 935–36 (7th Cir. 2000). Through these vertical agreements, the manu-
facturers cut down on production in exchange for the retailer’s protection against cheaters. Id. The 
majority in Apple II referenced the Seventh Circuit decision when considering that Apple’s contracts 
protected the publishing companies from Amazon’s $9.99 price standard. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 318 
(majority opinion). The dissent in Apple II noted that this jurisprudential support, however, predates 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin. Id. at 347 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
 78 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 323–25 (majority opinion). But see Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 730 n.4 (hold-
ing that a restraint is horizontal “not because it has horizontal effects, but because it is the product of a 
horizontal agreement”). 
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To reach this conclusion, the majority in Apple II disregarded the tradi-
tional distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements and instead fo-
cused on the type of restraint that Apple’s contracts imposed.79 This shift re-
sulted from the hub-and-spoke nature of the conspiracy.80 Apple, acting as the 
hub, entered into individual contracts with each Publishing Defendant, or the 
spokes.81 The Publishing Defendants separately conspired to raise and fix pric-
es in order to eliminate Amazon’s $9.99 price standard, thereby completing the 
rim of the wheel.82 It was this agreement to raise prices that the majority found 
violated the Sherman Act, but the MFN clause in Apple’s contracts provided 
the economic impetus to ensure the publishers’ collective action.83 Thus, Ap-
ple’s vertical agreement facilitated the horizontal conspiracy to raise and set 
ebook prices.84 Given that horizontal agreements to fix prices are considered 
the paradigm of anticompetitive conduct, the majority logically considered 
these agreements per se unlawful.85 
Unlike the majority’s assertion that a vertical agreement that facilitates a 
horizontal conspiracy is per se illegal, the dissenting judge agreed with the 
Third Circuit’s 2008 decision in Toledo Mack in applying Leegin to all vertical 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 322, 325. 
 80 Id. at 324–25; see also Toys “R” Us, 221 F.3d at 935–36 (holding that distributor facilitated 
horizontal agreement among manufacturers to reduce output). 
 81 See Apple II, 791 F.3d at 303–05, 324–25 (noting that Apple’s involvement in the horizontal 
agreement among the Publishing Defendants to raise prices averted any potential confusion with the 
hub-and-spoke context); see also Total Benefits, 552 F.3d at 436 (identifying combinations among 
market forces as hub-and-spoke conspiracies). 
 82 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 302; see also Total Benefits, 552 F.3d at 436 (holding that the spokes’ 
connection, or the rim of the wheel, determines whether the hub and spoke committed a per se viola-
tion). 
 83 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 320, 325, 327. Generally, a MFN clause requires the party setting the 
price to give the other party the best terms that any other competitor receives. Id. at 304. This clause 
forced the Publishing Defendants to switch all of its contracts with ebook retailers to an agency mod-
el. Id. at 305. Otherwise, Amazon could have continued its $9.99 price standard and the Publishing 
Defendants, despite controlling prices through the agency model, would have been forced to match 
this price for Apple. Id. at 304–05. Considering that the Publishing Defendants controlled a majority 
of the book industry, they had sufficient market power to effectively fix prices. See id. at 298 (point-
ing out that in 2010 Publishing Defendants published 90% of books listed on the New York Times 
Bestsellers list); see also Toledo Mack Sales & Serv. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 217 n.8 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (holding that collusion possible when manufacturers agree with retailers to artificially raise 
prices). The majority did not find that Apple’s contracts themselves were the subject of the Sherman 
Act violation, but instead pointed to Apple’s organization of the horizontal conspiracy as the per se 
unlawful conduct. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 323, 327. 
 84 See Apple II, 791 F.3d at 327, 339 (noting that Apple capitalized on Publishing Defendants’ 
concern with Amazon’s prices in order to raise prices in the ebook market). 
 85 Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 107–
08; see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940) (holding that 
price-fixing agreements banned without inquiry into any procompetitive justifications, because they 
pose a “threat to the central nervous system of the economy”); Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 
493 U.S. at 434 (holding that horizontal agreements for boycotts or price fixing pose threat to free 
market). 
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agreements.86 Rather than merging vertical agreements into the horizontal con-
spiracy for hub-and-spoke conspiracies, the dissent separated the horizontal 
and vertical agreements in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Leegin.87 As a strictly vertical agreement, therefore, the dissent argued that 
Apple’s contracts with the Publishing Defendants should have been analyzed 
through the rule of reason.88 
Both Judge Livingston and Judge Jacobs in Apple II acknowledged that 
the ebook industry is relatively new and therefore may deserve rule of reason 
treatment.89 Given the developing ebook technology and the switch to agency 
models over the traditional wholesale models, the industry is arguably novel 
enough to warrant rule of reason analysis.90 Significantly, the dissent in Leegin 
conceded that the per se rule should be modified for those agreements that 
constitute “new entry” into the market.91 In joining the ebook industry, Apple’s 
argument that the provisions of its contracts were necessary as a new entrant 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 324–25; id. at 346–47 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 
893); see Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 225 (observing that rule of reason analysis applicable despite 
manufacturers purposefully forming vertical agreements to help retailers’ illegal horizontal agree-
ments). Per the ruling in Toledo Mack, only the horizontal agreement that constitutes the rim of the 
conspiracy to fix prices among competitors is considered per se illegal. Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 221. 
 87 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 888 (“[T]he Court [has] rejected the approach of reliance on rules gov-
erning horizontal restraints when defining rules applicable to vertical ones.”); Apple II, 791 F.3d at 
346–48 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (arguing that every restraint is classified as either vertical or horizontal 
and is assessed accordingly). First, in pointing to Leegin’s overruling the Supreme Court’s 1911 deci-
sion in Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., the dissent emphasized that a manufacturer’s 
agreement that facilitates the retailers’ ability to set minimum prices was no longer considered per se 
unlawful. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 346 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. 877; Dr. Miles 
Med. Co., 220 U.S. 373). Then, the dissent reiterated Leegin’s holding for analyzing hub-and-spoke 
agreements under the rule of reason: “To the extent a vertical agreement setting minimum resale pric-
es is entered upon to facilitate either type of cartel . . . it, too, would need to be held unlawful under 
the rule of reason.” Id. (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893). 
 88 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 347–48 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). The dissent went on to evaluate Apple’s 
contracts through the rule of reason, addressing both the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of 
the contracts. Id. at 349–51. 
 89 Id. at 329 (majority opinion); id. at 348 (Jacobs, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Topco 
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972) (holding that per se rule should only be used once courts 
have had “considerable experience” with business relationship at issue); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. 
Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1986) (holding that courts are generally slow in applying per 
se rule when economic impact of certain practices not immediately obvious). 
 90 See Apple II, 791 F.3d at 299, 303 (observing both that the ebook industry, which only had one 
e-reader prior to the Kindle in 2007, doubled in revenue between 2007 and 2008 to $140 million, and 
that the agency model was not previously used in the publishing industry); id. at 348 (Jacobs, J., dis-
senting) (noting that business relationships unfamiliar to the court point in favor of using rule of rea-
son analysis, not per se rule). 
 91 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 917–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Vertical agreements issuing from new 
market entrants enable new entrants to gain a foothold while they build their product name and in-
crease the possibility of greater inter-brand competition. Id. at 913. 
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should have sufficed for receiving rule of reason treatment rather than being 
declared per se illegal.92 
III. SECOND CIRCUIT’S REVERSION TO PER SE ILLEGALITY FOR VERTICAL 
AGREEMENTS CREATES SHAKY FUTURE FOR ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2015 in United States 
v. Apple (“Apple II”) erred in applying per se illegality to Apple’s agreements 
with the Publishing Defendants.93 In identifying the agreements as vertical, the 
court should have applied the rule of reason analysis.94 Additionally, the rule of 
reason analysis was appropriate given the novelty of the ebook industry.95 This 
analysis would have brought any procompetitive justifications into considera-
tion to offset the anticompetitive effects of the agreements.96 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See id. at 917–18 (noting that exception to per se illegality may be necessary for new market 
entrants); Apple II, 791 F.3d at 330 (arguing that because Apple’s contracts challenged Amazon’s 
monopoly over ebooks, contracts enabled new retailers to enter ebook industry). As an alternative to 
per se illegality, Judge Livingston alone applied the abbreviated quick-look rule of reason. Apple II, 
791 F.3d at 329–30; see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) 
(holding that quick-look analysis appropriate for cases in which anticompetitive effects can “easily be 
ascertained”). Judge Livingston asserted that the immediate results of Apple’s contracts on the ebook 
industry demonstrated the anticompetitive effects. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 329–30. Thus, a fuller inquiry 
was not necessary, but the quick-look approach enabled the court to consider Apple’s procompetitive 
justifications. Id. at 329–30, 334. Despite considering Apple’s justifications for creating price-setting 
contracts, Judge Livingston still believed that these agreements with the publishing companies consti-
tuted a violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 330, 334–35. 
 93 United States v. Apple, Inc. (Apple II), 791 F.3d 290, 322–25 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, No. 
15-565, 2016 WL 854227 (Mar. 7, 2016) (mem.); see also Wan Cha, A New Post-Leegin Dilemma: 
Reconciliation of the Third Circuit’s Toledo Mack Case and the Second Circuit’s Apple E-Books 
Case, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1547, 1589–90 (2015) (discussing how Second Circuit’s decision cre-
ated circuit split in determining when to apply per se or rule of reason if both horizontal and vertical 
agreements are involved); Jared Killeen, Note, Throwing the E-Book at Publishers: What the Apple 
Case Tells Us About Antitrust Law, 22 J. L. & POL’Y 341, 392 (2014) (arguing that district court in 
2013 in United States v. Apple, Inc. should have applied rule of reason analysis and should have taken 
into consideration the novelty of the ebook industry and the procompetitive justifications). 
 94 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007) (holding that ver-
tical price agreements are analyzed under the rule of reason); Apple II, 791 F.3d at 323 (pointing out 
that Apple’s contracts with Publishing Defendants were vertical agreements). 
 95 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (noting that courts should apply rule of reason 
when unfamiliar with an industry); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972) 
(noting that courts must develop familiarity with business relationships before they can apply per se 
illegality). 
 96 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 913, 917–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that vertical price 
agreements may result in procompetitive justifications such as new market entry or deterring free 
riding); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990) (citing 
N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)) (noting that concerns for administrative effi-
ciency lead the per se standard to avoid otherwise tedious market inquiry). 
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The court in Apple II should not have applied per se illegality to Apple’s 
involvement in the conspiracy to raise and fix prices.97 This characterization of 
Apple’s contracts perpetuates the confusion regarding hub-and-spoke conspir-
acies.98 In acknowledging that the contracts were vertical agreements, the Sec-
ond Circuit should have followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in 
Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. and applied the rule of reason 
analysis to assess whether Apple’s contracts violated Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.99 Instead, the Second Circuit focused on Apple’s organization of the Pub-
lishing Defendants to raise and set ebook prices as the offensive conduct.100 
Even though Apple facilitated the Publishing Defendants’ horizontal con-
spiracy to raise prices, Apple’s involvement was through its contracts.101 The 
agency model of Apple’s contracts enabled the Publishing Defendants to seize 
control of retail prices, but the contracts’ price caps ensured that such prices 
were below a predetermined ceiling.102 Additionally, with the MFN clause, 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 322–25; see also Cha, supra note 93, at 1552–79 (highlighting guidelines 
from Leegin as new economic framework by which courts should assess hub-and-spoke agreements 
before applying per se rule or rule of reason); Jennifer D. Lee, Post U.S. v. Apple: How Should Most-
Favored Nation Clauses Be Treated Now?, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 237, 255, 259 (2015) 
(noting that, in spite of Second Circuit’s holding, MFN clauses should still be analyzed under the rule 
of reason). 
 98 See Apple II, 791 F.3d at 324–25 (holding that Apple’s vertical agreements with Publishing 
Defendants facilitated horizontal conspiracy); see also Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc., v. An-
them Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 435–36 (6th Cir. 2008) (differentiating the hub-and-
spoke arrangement at issue from the hub-and-spoke arrangement in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Federal 
Trade Commission based on the lack of a rim, or horizontal agreement, among the spokes). 
 99 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893 (holding that rule of reason analysis applies even if vertical agree-
ment establishing minimum resale prices promotes illegal horizontal agreement); Bus. Elec. Corp. v. 
Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730–31 n.4 (1988) (holding restraint’s arrangement, not its conse-
quences, determines whether it is horizontal or vertical); Apple II, 791 F.3d at 323 (noting that rule of 
reason applicable standard for vertical agreement between manufacturers and distributors who fix 
prices). The U.S. Supreme Court in 1997 in State Oil Co. v. Khan had previously determined that 
vertical maximum price-fixing arrangements, which would include price caps, should be analyzed 
under the rule of reason. 522 U.S. at 17; see also Warren S. Grimes, Making Sense of State Oil Co. v. 
Khan: Vertical Maximum Price Fixing Under a Rule of Reason, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 567, 598–99 
(1998) (applying rule of reason to vertical maximum price-fixing agreements allows for safe harbor if 
the dealer has not incurred any sunk costs, a presumption of illegality if there are sunk costs, and an 
opportunity to rebut this presumption if the resale price ceiling is reasonably procompetitive); Roger 
D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht Rule After Khan: Death Becomes Her, 74 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV.123, 164 (1998) (arguing that, despite being a vague and costly standard, rule of reason should 
also be applied to horizontal agreements for price caps because per se rule fails to deter such conduct). 
 100 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 323. 
 101 Id. at 305, 308, 320 n.19; see also Toledo Mack Sales & Serv. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 
204, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he rule of reason analysis applies even when . . . the plaintiff alleges that 
the purpose of the vertical agreement between a manufacturer and its dealers is to support illegal hori-
zontal agreements between multiple dealers.”). Apple used its knowledge of the publishing compa-
nies’ disdain for Amazon’s $9.99 price standard as leverage for pushing through its own contracts. 
Apple II, 791 F.3d at 301–03. 
 102 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 310–11. 
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Apple knew that the publishing companies would need to adopt agency models 
with all of their retailers.103 Although these contracts facilitated the Publishing 
Defendants’ desire to eliminate the $9.99 price standard, the contracts were 
still vertical agreements between Apple, as the retailer, and the Publishing De-
fendants, as the manufacturers.104 The contracts should have been considered 
separately to determine the proper analysis, regardless of the hub-and-spoke 
context of the arrangements.105 
Despite the immediate anticompetitive effects in publishing, per se ille-
gality was inappropriate in Apple II given the novelty of both the ebook indus-
try and the lack of jurisprudence for certain contractual provisions.106 As the 
ebook industry was still relatively new and the court had not yet established 
knowledge of these business relationships, the Second Circuit should have ap-
plied the rule of reason.107 The U.S. Supreme Court in Leegin acknowledged 
that new entrants should be provided an opportunity to justify their re-
                                                                                                                           
 103 Id. at 304–05. 
 104 See Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 730 (1988) (observing that horizontal agreements exist between 
competitors and vertical agreements exist between firms at different market levels); Apple II, 791 F.3d 
at 323 (noting that Apple’s contracts with the Publishing Defendants constituted vertical agreements). 
 105 See Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. 730 n.4 (1988) (explaining that restraints are horizontal because of 
structure of arrangement, not because of resultant effects on market); Total Benefits, 552 F.3d at 435–
36 (explaining that because hub-and-spoke conspiracy does not necessarily warrant per se rule, plain-
tiffs must allege horizontal relationship for an agreement to be per se unlawful); see also Mark A. 
Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1207, 1219 (2008) (identifying whether an agreement is horizontal or vertical is critical because the 
agreements are assessed under different tests); Barak Orbach, The Durability of Formalism in Anti-
trust, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2197, 2214 (2015) (explaining that the distinction between horizontal and 
vertical agreements is “exceptionally important for antitrust analysis” but also that the distinction 
between good vertical agreements and bad horizontal agreements in hub-and-spoke context may be 
difficult to sustain). Both the rule of reason and the quick-look rule of reason, however, have received 
criticism in terms of their ability to regulate Sherman Act violations. See Feldman, supra note 23, at 
595–97 (arguing that judicial efficiency of essential importance for antitrust analysis given breadth of 
economic inquiry); Maxwell M. Belcher, Schwinn—An Example of a Genuine Commitment to Anti-
trust Law, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 550, 553 (1975) (explaining that rule of reason generally perceived as 
“euphemism for an endless economic inquiry resulting in a defense verdict”); Leading Cases, supra 
note 29, at 406 (noting that quick look provides defendants with opportunity to justify restraints but in 
practice defendants usually lose argument because of inherent anticompetitive effects). 
 106 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 913, 917–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that vertical price agree-
ments to fix prices can enable new parties to enter the market, rendering per se illegality potentially 
inappropriate); Apple II, 791 F.3d at 310 (discussing how ebook industry was both new and rapidly 
developing). 
 107 See Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 
458–59 (1986)) (noting that court reluctant to apply per se illegality for those restraints when potential 
economic impact not immediately apparent); Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 607–08 (holding that courts 
must attain familiarity with business relationships before per se rule can be applied). Amazon’s Kindle 
had only been on the market for three years before Apple launched the iPad with the iBookstore fea-
ture. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 299, 301. 
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strictions.108 Furthermore, though the Court in 1997 in State Oil Co. v. Khan 
found that vertical maximum price agreements, which include price caps, 
should be assessed under the rule of reason, neither the MFN clause nor the 
agency model was traditionally prosecuted as an antitrust violation.109 
Just because this was a novel area and the contracts deserved a thorough 
analysis, however, does not excuse Apple from antitrust prosecution.110 The 
contracts caused an increase in prices for both ebooks and physical books, and 
resulted in decreased output.111 By giving the Publishing Defendants the ability 
to set prices and enforcing the MFN clause, Apple’s contracts effectively elim-
inated retail price competition, which is a violation of Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.112 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and 
the Second Circuit should have assessed the contracts under the rule of reason 
to provide Apple, as both a new market entrant and a vertical player, the oppor-
tunity to justify its contracts in the novel area of ebook publishing.113 
CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Apple II demonstrates the confusion re-
garding hub-and-spoke conspiracies and whether any corresponding vertical 
agreements should be per se unlawful or analyzed under the rule of reason. In 
Apple II, the majority found that, even though Apple’s contracts were vertical 
agreements, the contracts’ facilitation of a horizontal conspiracy to raise prices 
was per se illegal. This decision contradicted the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Leegin, which ruled that all vertical restraints should be analyzed 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891–92, 894 (explaining that resale price maintenance, including price 
caps, for new products or brands important for interbrand competition and to stimulate the economy). 
Significantly, the dissent in Leegin also agreed that new market entry might warrant further scrutiny. 
Id. at 917 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 109 Khan, 522 U.S. at 17; see United States v. Gen. Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926) (noting 
that agency contracts do not necessarily violate Sherman Act); Weiner, supra note 8, at 68 (observing 
that no court has found MFN clauses unlawful). 
 110 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 888 (holding that sufficient economic differences require treating 
horizontal and vertical agreements differently); Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 730 (observing that horizontal 
restraints are formed between competitors at same market level and vertical restraints are formed 
between businesses at different market levels); Apple II, 791 F.3d at 329, 335 (noting that, despite 
Apple’s innovative business arrangements, Apple’s contracts still unreasonably restrained trade under 
the rule of reason analysis and, therefore, violated the Sherman Act). 
 111 Apple II, 791 F.3d at 310–11. 
 112 Id. at 297, 303, 310, 329. 
 113 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893 (noting that vertical price agreements should be analyzed under 
rule of reason); id. at 917–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing how restraints involving new market 
entry should possibly be considered under rule of reason); Khan, 522 U.S. at 17 (holding that vertical 
price fixing can be properly analyzed under the rule of reason); see also Lemley, supra note 105, at 
1220 (explaining that after Leegin, all vertical price restraints subject to rule of reason analysis); 
Killeen, supra note 93, at 377–83 (discussing how uniqueness of ebook market should mandate rule of 
reason analysis). 
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through the rule of reason. In the future, courts should clarify whether vertical 
agreements embedded in hub-and-spoke conspiracies are separate or if they 
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